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The decision was long awaited, since after having imposed several fines for gun jump-
ing practices in recent times, it is the first case ever in which the Court has been asked 
to take position on the matter through a preliminary ruling. As for substance, the 
European Court of Justice stated that article 7, paragraph 1 of the EUMR must be 
interpreted as meaning that a concentration is implemented only by a transaction 
which contributes to the change in control of the target undertaking.
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Introduction
On 31 May 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ or Court) ruled on 
the preliminary questions referred by the Sø-og Handelsretten (the Danish 
Maritime and Commercial Court, hereinafter the Referring Court) in case 
C-633/161 (Decision).2
The Decision was long awaited by scholars, professionals and market 
players, since for the first time the ECJ was asked to explore the bounda-
ries of the so-called standstill obligation imposed on the parties of a noti-
fiable transaction by article 7, paragraph 1 the Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (EUMR).3
As for substance, the Court held that article 7, paragraph 1 of the EUMR 
must be interpreted as meaning that a concentration is implemented only 
by a transaction which, in whole or in part, in fact or in law, contributes to 
the change in control of the target undertaking.4
The importance of the Decision is twofold.
First of all, from a merger control policy perspective, the Decision con-
firms the increasing interest shown by the European Union (EU) compe-
tition authorities in the enforcement of merger control procedural rules. 
1 Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371.
2 For the first comments to the Decision, see Pietro Missanelli, “La portata dell’obbligo di stand-
still di cui all’art. 7, Regolamento (CE) 139/2004 nel periodo antecedente all’autorizzazione di una 
concentrazione tra imprese”, Diritto del Commercio Internazionale 3 (2018): 765, and Michele 
Giannino, “Is it too early wrong? The Court of Justice of the EU clarifies the concept of gun-jump-
ing”, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3236909. 
3 Until the publication of the Decision, the topic had received only limited attention by the aca-
demic community.
Among the most significant contributions, see Stéphane Dionnet and Pauline Giroux, “Gun 
jumping”, 2017, https://www.skadden.com/-/media/files/publications/2017/01/gun_jumping.
pdf; Francesco Carloni, “Electrabel v Commission & COMP M.7184 Marine Harvest/Morpol: 
Gun-jumping and violation the merger standstill obligation in Europe”, Journal of European 
Competition Law and Practice 5, no. 10 (2018): 693; Massimiliano Kadar, “Case T-704/14 – Marine 
Harvest v. Commission: On ‘gun jumping’ and public bids”, Journal of European Competition Law 
and Practice 9, no 4 (2018): 239; Frederic Depoortere and Stephane Lelart, “The standstill obliga-
tion in the ECMR”, World Competition 33, no. 1 (2010), 103; Bruno Alomar et al., “Electrabel/
CNR: The importance of the standstill obligation in merger proceedings”, Competition Policy 
Newsletter 3 (2009), 58; James R. Modrall and Stefano Ciullo, “Gun-jumping and EU merger con-
trol”, European Competition Law Review 24, no. 9 (2003): 424; as well as the milestones John C. 
Cook and Cristopher S. Kerse, EC Merger Control (London: Sweet & Maxwell), 144 and Nicholas 
Levy and Cristopher Cook, European Merger Control Law (New York: LexisNexis), 17.03.
4 See Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, 
paragraph 59.
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Secondly, from a normative point of view, the Decision provides wel-
come guidance on one of the most controversial issues arising from the 
EUMR, i.e. the extent to which the merging parties can take preparatory 
steps to close a transaction before the clearance of the competent competi-
tion authority. The issue is of significant importance because it requires to 
strike the right balance between (a) the market players’ need to carry out 
pre-merger activities and (b) the legal requirements brought by the EUMR. 
Unsurprisingly, the Decision also offers a comprehensive overview of the 
EU merger control system and of its cornerstones, thus having a significant 
systematic value.
The present contribution is structured as follows: after a brief description 
of the facts of the case (see paragraph 2), I will provide an overview of its 
legal context (see paragraph 3), giving particular emphasis to the notion 
of concentration under the EUMR (see paragraph 3.1), to the so-called 
standstill obligation (see paragraph 3.2) and to the concept of gun jump-
ing (see paragraph 3.3), which have been given significant importance by 
the ECJ in order to answer the questions referred. The last two paragraphs 
are dedicated to the description of the findings of the ECJ (see paragraph 
4) and to some conclusive remarks (see paragraph 5).
1. The facts of the case and the opinion of Advocate General Wahl
The Referring Court sought a preliminary ruling by the ECJ in the context 
of an action for annulment brought by Ernst & Young P/S against a deci-
sion of the Danish Competition Council (DCC).5
According to the DCC, Ernst & Young, Ernst & Young Europe LLP, 
Ernst & Young Godkendt Revisionsaktieselskab, Ernst & Young Global 
Limited and EYGS LLP (the “EY Companies”) and KPMG Statsautoriseret 
Revisionspartnerselkab, Komplementarselskabet af 1. Januar 2009 
Statsautoriseret Revisionsaktieselkab and KPMG Ejendomme Flinthom 
K/S (the “KPMG DK Companies”) had infringed paragraph 12c(5) of 
the Danish law on competition, which prohibits the implementation of a 
merger prior to its approval by the DCC in a similar way as article 7 EUMR. 
Coming to the merits of the case, by agreement concluded in November 
2013 (Agreement) the KPMG DK Companies and the EY Companies 
decided to merge. According to the parties’ preliminary assessment, the 
5 See Decision 14/07180 SAM/MAN/JKK/CWA, https://www.en.kfst.dk/media/3301/20141217-
overtraedelse-af-praeimplementeringsforbud1.pdf (Danish language only).
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merger at stake did not have a Community dimension within the meaning 
of the EUMR, but had to be notified to the competent Danish authorities. 
At the time of the conclusion of the Agreement, the KPMG DK 
Companies were part of an international network of independent audit-
ing firms (KPMG International) pursuant to a cooperation agreement 
which harmonised how the KPMG DK Companies operated inside KPMG 
International.6 In implementation of the Agreement, on 18 November 2013 
the KPMG DK Companies announced that, with a view to the merger with 
the EY Companies, they were withdrawing from KPMG International. The 
termination of the cooperation agreement was not in itself notified to any 
competition authority.
On 13 December 2013, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority 
was notified of the merger between the KPMG DK Companies and the EY 
Companies, which was then cleared on 28 May 2014.7
Following the clearance of the transaction, the DCC declared that the 
KPMG DK Companies had violated the prohibition of implementing a 
concentration prior to its approval by giving notice to terminate the coop-
eration agreement before obtaining a formal clearance. According to the 
DCC, the notice of termination of the cooperation agreement could well 
amount to an early implementation since it was (a) merger-specific, (b) 
irreversible and (c) likely to have market effects in the period between the 
notice of termination itself and the approval of the merger.
Ernst & Young brought an action for annulment of the DCC decision 
before the Referring Court. Since the Danish rules on merger control are 
based on the EUMR and the DCC’s decision essentially referred to the 
6 More specifically, as explained in Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, paragraphs 12 and 13, under the cooperation agreement the KPMG DK 
Companies had the exclusive right to be included in KMPG International in Denmark and to use 
the trademarks of KPMG International for marketing purposes in that Member State. Moreover, 
the cooperation agreement also contained provisions on the allocation of customers, the obliga-
tion to serve clients from other Member States and the annual compensation for participation 
in the network. In addition, it provided that the participating auditing firms could not conclude 
commercial contracts such as partnerships or joint ventures. It also established a voluntary and 
integrated cooperation between the participating auditing firms, under which the firms operated 
according to the same standards and norms and presented themselves to clients as a combined net-
work, although each of them was an autonomous and independent undertaking for the purposes 
of competition law.
7 See “Denmark: Merger in the audit industry approved with commitments”, Danish Competition 
and Consumer Authority. https://www.en.kfst.dk/nyheder/kfst/english/decisions/20140528-den-
mark-merger-in-the-audit-industry-approved-with-commitments/. 
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European Commission’s decision-making practice and to the case-law of 
the ECJ, the referring Court considered that the interpretation of article 7, 
paragraph 1 of the EUMR was relevant for the case and therefore asked for 
clarifications from the ECJ.
As far as the position of the parties is concerned, EY argued that the 
termination of the cooperation agreement could not fall within the pro-
hibition of article 7 EUMR since it could not in itself amount to a concen-
tration under the EUMR. In EY’s view, such an interpretation would not 
hamper the effectiveness of the European merger control system, since the 
possible effects on competition of measures falling outside the scope of 
the standstill obligation could still be subject to competition law by means 
of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. At the opposite, the Danish Government8 
and the European Commission adopted a more conservative approach, 
arguing that “the standstill obligation cannot be restricted to measures 
which, in themselves, entail an actual change of control but must include 
any measures which, given the circumstances, are apt to restrict or render 
more difficult the effective ex ante merger control”.9
Advocate General (AG) Nils Wahl delivered his Opinion on 18 January 
2018.10
Interestingly enough, the AG took distance from the reasoning of the 
Referring Court with specific regard to the relevance it attached to the three 
criteria of merger-specificity, irreversibility and market effects. Indeed, the 
AG argued that trying to enumerate general criteria would pose the risk of 
excluding certain measures from the notion of standstill obligation, to the 
detriment of an effective merger control system.
As far as the criteria submitted by the DCC are concerned, according 
to the AG merger specificity is a prerequisite for – and not a criterion of 
– application of the standstill obligation. Such a criterion might make it 
easier to exclude certain measures which patently have nothing to do with 
the implementation of a concentration, but “does not provide any added 
value as without it the Commission’s power under the EUMR would not 
8 Interestingly enough, the Danish government supported its position referring to the findings of 
the General Court in Electrabel v. European Commission regarding the importance of an ex ante 
merger control system, which will be described in detail under paragraph 3.3.
9 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 41.
10 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23.
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even come into question”.11 The same applies to the irreversibility criterion, 
which according to the AG may be “excessively speculative” and would 
run contrary to some provisions of the EUMR. Indeed, article 8, para-
graph 5, letters a and c of the EUMR empowers the Commission to order 
the reversal of measures which implement a concentration prematurely: it 
would seem contradictory for the Commission to have such a power if the 
application of the standstill depended on the irreversibility of a measure. 
Finally, as far as the creation of market effects is concerned, according to 
the AG not only do commercial measures almost invariably have some 
effect on the market, but a market effects criterion would inevitably overlap 
with the merits of the assessment of the transaction by the Commission. 
Quoting the AG, “if such a criterion were relevant, it would […] make the 
standstill obligation […] a type of automatic injunction procedure”.12
In light of the above, according to the AG the scope of the standstill obli-
gation shall be demarcated by means of a negative definition. From this 
point of view, the starting point for correctly shaping the notion of stand-
still obligation should be the notion of concentration, given that article 7 
of the EUMR expressly refers to a “concentration with an EU dimension”, 
as defined in article 1 thereof. Given that a concentration is the acquisi-
tion of the possibility of exercising decisive influence on a target undertak-
ing, the standstill obligation cannot apply to merely internal preparatory 
measures preceding a concentration.13 Only measures that are intrinsic 
to a concentration must be caught. This is further confirmed by the fact 
that interpreting the standstill obligation without linking it to the concept 
of concentration would pose the risk that certain measures lying in the 
“periphery of a concentration” although not “inextricably linked” 14 to the 
transfer of control would be caught thereby. Conversely, if the reach of that 
grey area were greater than the scope of the concept of a concentration, 
that would imply extending that obligation beyond the scope of the EUMR 
as expressed in article 1 thereof and going beyond what is necessary to 
maintain an effective merger control.
11 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 49.
12 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 55.
13 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 63.
14 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 68.
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In light of the above, the AG concluded that the obligation laid down 
by article 7 EUMR does not affect measures like the one carried out by 
the parties to the transaction at stake which, although taken in connec-
tion with the process leading to a concentration, precede and are severable 
from the measures actually leading to the acquisition of the possibility of 
exercising decisive influence on a target undertaking.15
2. The legal context
As anticipated in paragraph 1 and confirmed by the Opinion of the AG 
(see paragraph 2), in order to gain a better understanding of the rationale 
underpinning the Decision it is useful to briefly recall certain aspects of 
EU merger control law, namely the concept of concentration under the 
EUMR (see paragraph 3.1), the so-called standstill obligation (see para-
graph 3.2) and the concept of gun jumping (see paragraph 3.3).
2.1. The notion of concentration under the EUMR
As is well known, EU merger law mainly stems from two sources: the 
EUMR16 and the European Commission’s Consolidated Jurisdictional 
Notice (Jurisdictional Notice),17 which describes the practice of the 
European Commission (Commission) in regard to the scope of applica-
tion of the EUMR.18 
15 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 88.
16 The Commission recently defined the EUMR as a “major overhaul”, see European Commission, 
White Paper towards more effective EU merger control, COMP(2014) 449 final, July 9, 2014, http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_merger_control/mergers_white_paper_en.pdf, 4. 
17 European Commission, Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 139/20017 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008/C 
95/01, April 16, 2008, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A5200
8XC0416%2808%29.
18 For the sake of completeness, it is worth recalling that the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, as well as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) do not contain specific provisions applying competition law to 
concentrations, unlike the Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community, which 
required certain transactions in the coal and steel sectors to be notified to the Commission. 
The European Commission’s view, endorsed by the European Court of Justice in the Continental 
Can judgment, was in the sense that articles 101 and 102 TFEU were not sufficient to apply compe-
tition law to mergers and therefore the Commission needed an ad hoc legal instrument to control 
concentrations leading to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
After an intense debate, the first merger regulation was adopted in December 1989 and came into 
force in 1990. 
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As underlined by the European Commission, the EUMR has the fun-
damental objectives of “protecting consumers against the effects of 
monopoly power (higher prices, lower quality, lower production, less 
innovation)”19 and of addressing “all potential sources of possible harm to 
competition, and thus consumers, caused by concentrations or corporate 
restructuring”.20
The EU merger policy as arises from the EUMR and the Jurisdictional 
Notice is based on three key assumptions.21 First, as declared under recital 3 
of the EUMR, “the completion of the internal market and of economic and 
monetary union, the enlargement of the European Union and the lower-
ing of international barriers to trade and investment will continue to result 
in major corporate reorganisations, particularly in the form of concentra-
tions”. Second, as continues recital 4 of the EUMR, such reorganisations 
are welcome “to the extent that they are in line with the requirements of 
dynamic competition and capable of increasing the competitiveness of 
European industry, improving the conditions of growth and raising the 
standard of living in the Community”. Finally, in light of the above, “it 
should be ensured that the process of reorganisation does not result in last-
ing damage to competition”. This is the reason why EU law must include 
provisions governing concentrations which may “significantly impede 
effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it”.22
That said, as recalled by the AG, the starting point for correctly shaping 
the notion of standstill obligation has to be the notion of concentration. 
But what exactly is a concentration pursuant to the EUMR?
Generally speaking, as recently recalled by the OECD,23 the definition 
of what constitutes a concentration can be based on objective or economic 
criteria. Most jurisdictions have opted for more economic criteria, accord-
ing to which a concentration is deemed to arise when the transaction leads 
to the acquisition by a company of single or joint control over another. 
19 European Commission, XXXI Report on Competition Policy 2001, 2002, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/annual_report/2001/en.pdf, paragraph 252.
20 EC, White Paper, 2014: 4.
21 Levy and Cook, European Merger Control Law, 1-1.
22 See recital 5 of the EUMR. 
That is also the reason why, as clearly stated in the European Commission XX Report on 
Competition Policy, paragraph 20, the Commission has always viewed the EUMR as “a vital addi-
tional instrument […] to ensure a system of undistorted competition in the Community”. 
23 See OECD, Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications and Gun Jumping, 27-28 November 2018, 
DAF/COMP(2018)11, 6. 
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This kind of definition is more substantial in nature and may well end up 
being broader. On the other hand, objective criteria give relevance to fac-
tors such as a certain shareholding in the target firm: this has “the positive 
consequence of being easy to assess and thus leave little room for uninten-
tionally failing to notify”.24
As recalled by AG Wahl (see paragraph 2), within the EU legal order 
the definition of what constitutes a concentration is provided by article 
3 of the EUMR and is further explained in the case law of the ECJ and in 
Part B of the Jurisdictional Notice. Under article 3 of the EUMR, a con-
centration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting 
basis “results from: (a) the merger of two or more previously independent 
undertakings or parts of undertakings, or (b) the acquisition, by one or 
more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or 
more undertakings […] of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts 
of one or more other undertakings”.
The concept of merger25 (which is the most relevant for the purposes 
of the present contribution, given the nature of the transaction involv-
ing the KPMG DK Companies and the EY Companies) is not defined 
in the EUMR, although the Jurisdictional Notice explains that a merger 
occurs where two or more independent undertakings “amalgamate in a 
new undertaking and cease to exist as separate legal entities”.26 A merger 
may also occur where one undertaking is absorbed by another, the latter 
retaining its legal identity while the former ceases to exist as a distinct 
legal entity.27 In the absence of a legal merger, a merger within the mean-
ing of the EUMR may also occur where the combination of the activities 
of previously independent undertakings results in the creation of a single 
economic unit.28 
24 OECD, Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications and Gun Jumping, 7.
25 For further readings on mergers, see Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and the Italian works of Piero Fattori and Mario Todino, 
La Disciplina della Concorrenza in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010) and Matteo Beretta and Marco 
d’Ostuni, Il Sistema del Controllo delle Concentrazioni in Italia (Torino: Giappichelli, 2018).
26 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 9.
27 On the other hand, a merger within the meaning of the EUMR is not deemed to occur where a 
target company is merged with a subsidiary of the acquiring company, so that the parent company 
acquires control of the target company.
28 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 9.
See also Case No. COMP/M.2510 – Cendent/Galileo; Case No. COMP/M5529, Oracle/Sun 
Microsystems, and Case No. COMP/5611 Agilent/Varian. 
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In light of the above, it should be clear why AG Wahl underlined that the 
notion of concentration is closely linked with the one of control. 
According to the provisions of the EUMR and of the Jurisdictional 
Notice, the notion of control which is relevant for the purposes of estab-
lishing whether there is a concentration is quite broad. More specifically, 
under article 3, paragraph 2 of the EUMR, control is defined as the pos-
sibility of exercising a “decisive influence” on an undertaking, by means 
of “rights, contracts or any other means, either separately or in combi-
nation and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved”. 
The Commission has interpreted the notion of decisive influence broadly 
to include positive rights to manage another undertaking, as well as veto 
rights over another undertaking’s commercial policy. Therefore, control 
can exist on a legal (de jure) or a factual (de facto, see further paragraph 3.2) 
basis.29 Control may be exercised solely by a single undertaking or jointly, 
by two or more undertakings. The notion of control under the EUMR may 
differ from notions of control developed in other areas of EU legislation, 
including with respect to prudential rules, taxation, air transportation or 
media. Accordingly, the interpretation of control in other areas of EU law 
is not necessarily decisive in analysing control under the EUMR.30 Control 
under the EUMR may also differ from provisions of national legislation, 
including national competition law.31 As a result, “different legal or factual 
assessments by different authorities, each acting in accordance with their 
own powers, cannot always be avoided, especially if these authorities act 
on a different legal basis”.32
If a certain transaction amounts to a concentration under the EUMR 
and meets the turnover thresholds set forth by the EUMR, that transaction 
will fall within the ex ante merger control system designed by the EUMR.33
This may be the case in particular where two or more undertakings, while retaining their indi-
vidual legal personalities, contractually establish a common economic management or operate as 
a dual-listed company. A prerequisite for the determination of a single economic unit is the exist-
ence of a permanent, distinct management, see EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 10.
29 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 16.
30 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 23.
31 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 22.
32 See Commission Decision of 26 June 2002, declaring a merger to be compatible with the com-
mon market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2650 – Haniel/Cementbouw/JV (CVK)).
33 As recalled by the OECD, Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications and Gun Jumping, 5, most 
merger control regimes, just like the EU, adopt ex ante merger control, typically coupled with 
standstill obligations. There are three reasons for the provision of pre-merger notification obliga-
tions. First of all, they aim at ensuring that mergers do not have negative effects on market struc-
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In this regard, it is worth recalling that the notion of control is used both 
to determine whether a given operation is notifiable under the EUMR and 
to establish which entities should be taken into account for purposes of 
assessing the revenues of those undertakings directly affected by a con-
centration, which in turn determines whether the EUMR’s jurisdictional 
thresholds are met.34
The difficulties that businesses face when trying to ascertain their pre-
merger notification duties are amplified by the fact that even though simi-
lar concepts for transactions, thresholds and turnover calculation and 
exemptions will be used in most jurisdictions, there are still significant 
variations in the legal rules and in their application between jurisdictions. 
For example, the same transaction can be considered a reportable minor-
ity stake in one jurisdiction, but not in another.
Once it is established that a certain transaction amounts to a concentra-
tion pursuant to the EUMR and that it is subject to mandatory notifica-
tion for pre-merger control, the standstill obligation provided by article 7 
EUMR will be triggered.
2.2. Article 7 of the EUMR
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the EUMR, named “suspension of concentra-
tions”, states that a concentration with a Community dimension shall not 
be implemented (i.e. its implementation must be suspended) either “before 
its notification or until it has been declared compatible with the common 
market”. Article 7, paragraph 2 of the EUMR provides for some limited 
exemptions from the application of paragraph 1 for the cases of public bids 
tures in the interim period. Secondly, it avoids the potentially difficult untangling of assets and 
business relationships, and, finally, it aims at preventing illicit pre-merger information exchanges. 
Put differently, the rationale behind pre-merger notification is to ensure that the merging parties 
remain independent market players until the competent antitrust authority has had the chance 
to review the transaction, thus preventing competition problems before they arise as fixing them 
after the closing of the transaction may be much harder. On the other hand, one should not forget 
that merger activity is mostly beneficial, as is made clear by the vast majority of mergers which are 
approved without conditions everywhere in the world. Mergers are a means for companies to com-
pete and to realise welfare-enhancing efficiencies. Delaying merger implementation thus imposes 
costs not only on merging parties, but to society more generally.
34 Notification thresholds are used to identify the transactions that have sufficient material weight 
and nexus to a given jurisdiction and should be notified for merger control. Commonly used cri-
teria are turnover and/or assets or thresholds, along with the value of the transaction and market 
share thresholds. Additional criteria are sometimes adopted.
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or of a series of transactions in securities, by which control is acquired 
from various sellers.
As ultimately recalled by AG Wahl in the case at issue, the function of 
this obligation – more commonly referred to as “standstill obligation” or 
as the imposition of a “waiting period” – is “to deter undertakings from 
implementing concentrations prematurely, pending assessment by the 
competition authorities, and to reduce the risk that a concentration will 
have to be undone in case it is not approved”.35 Put differently, article 7, 
paragraph 1 of the EUMR pursues the objective of enhancing the efficiency 
of the whole merger control process, as it aims at protecting competition, 
safeguarding the independence and autonomy of the merging parties, and 
facilitating an eventual break-up that may be ordered at the end of the 
merger review process.
The usefulness of such a tool is confirmed by the fact that the majority of 
the merger control systems across the world make use of it.36 Nevertheless, 
exceptions exist: for instance, in the European Union this is the case in 
Italy,37 Latvia and the United Kingdom. As confirmed by AG Wahl, that 
indicates that “while the standstill obligation might be useful, it would seem 
excessive […] to classify it as an indispensable tool for merger control”.38
35 See Opinion of AG Nils Wahl delivered on 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, 
C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 35.
36 For example, in the USA section 7A HSR imposes the obligation to notify and prescribes a wait-
ing period of 30 days (which can be extended by another 30 days) during which the merging parties 
are prohibited from shifting beneficial ownership over the target to the acquiring party.
The Japanese anti-monopoly act requires prior notification of merger plans above certain turnover 
thresholds, including minority acquisitions. Notifying parties are prohibited from implementing 
mergers for 30 days after the notification has been received by the local competition authority. Also 
Canada and Brazil have standstill obligations.
37 In Italy, pre-merger notification obligations do not trigger a suspension of the merger, which 
can be implemented prior to clearance. When a second phase investigation is opened, the Italian 
Competition Authority may issue an order not to implement the transaction if the latter raised 
serious competition concerns.
38 See paragraph 35 of the Opinion.
Levy and Cook, European Merger Control Law, 7.1 describe the suspension of notifiable mergers 
pending approval by the Commission as one of the “principal procedural rules” of the European 
Union merger control system.
On the other hand, during a speech given on 10 March 2016, reining the EU merger control sys-
tem, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announce-
ments/refining-eu-merger-control-system_en, Commissionaire Vestager declared that in cases of 
gun jumping “any damage to competition might already be done before we can take our decision. 
So we keep a very close eye on whether companies are complying with the procedural rules”. 
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Because of its broad formulation, article 7, paragraph 1 of the EUMR has 
often given rise to uncertainties like the one which gave rise to the Decision. 
As noted,39 one of the most controversial issues regards the acquisition of 
minority shareholding, which may well raise questions under article 7 
EUMR. In order to better understand all the potential implications of the 
Decision, it is worth recalling some of the issues related to minority share-
holding acquisitions.
Indeed, minority shareholdings may, in some situations, confer de facto 
control; their acquisition can be considered as a partial implementation of 
a broader concentration or as interrelated with another transaction. As far 
as de facto control is concerned, according to the Jurisdictional Notice the 
main assessment criterion is the likelihood of achieving a majority at the 
target’s shareholders’ meeting, given the level of its shareholding and the 
evidence resulting from the presence of shareholders in the shareholders’ 
meetings in previous years.40 The Commission usually considers voting 
patterns at shareholders’ meetings held in the last three to five years. Other 
factors taken into account by the Commission may be the dispersion of 
the remaining shares, the structural, economic or family links of impor-
tant shareholders with the large minority shareholders, and the nature of 
other shareholders’ interests (whether strategic or purely financial).41 As 
other authors observed,42 a review of the cases in which the Commission 
concluded that a minority shareholding conferred de facto control shows 
that a large number of different situations can lead to de facto control and 
that it is certainly not always easy to determine whether or not control is 
acquired.43 Determining whether a minority shareholding will confer de 
facto control is therefore a difficult exercise.
In principle, as long as minority shareholding does not confer control, 
there is no need for notification. In terms of article 7, paragraph 1 EUMR 
39 Deporteere and Lelart, “The standstill obligation in the ECMR”, 105.
40 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 59.
41 EC, Jurisdictional Notice, paragraph 59.
42 Deporteere and Lelart, “The standstill obligation in the ECMR”, 105.
43 See inter alia Commission Decision of 05/05/2008 declaring a concentration to be compatible 
with the common market and the EEA Agreement (Case No. Comp/M.4956 – STX/Aker Yards); 
Commission Decision of 23 April 1997 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the com-
mon market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No. IV/M.754 – Anglo American 
Corporation/Lonrho); Commission Decision, declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market (Case No. IV/M.906 – Mannesmann / Vallourec); and Commission Decision 
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No. COMP/M.4336 
– MAN/Scania).
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consequences, this means that the acquisition of minority shareholdings 
can be implemented without any obligation to suspend the transaction 
pursuant to the obligation provided therein. Problems arise because, as 
is well known, the Commission may, in certain circumstances, consider 
a group of interrelated transactions as one single merger operation where 
the transactions at issue are interdependent in such a way that none of 
them would be carried out without the others and that the result consists 
in conferring on one or more undertakings direct or indirect economic 
control over the activities of one or more undertakings. Such an approach 
is obviously justified with the need to prevent circumvention of the merger 
rules by artificially creating interrelated transactions. Whether or not the 
merger rules are artificially circumvented is a case-by-case exercise. It fol-
lows that, as a general matters, it is not at all clear what companies can 
and cannot do before obtaining approval from the Commission under the 
EUMR. Before the Decision, the almost non-existent case law on pre-clos-
ing practices and gun jumping provided basically no guidance.
That is (one of the reasons) why the Decision is so significant.
That is why it may be useful to briefly go into the so-called gun jumping 
issue.
2.3. Gun jumping
“Gun jumping” refers to infringements of both the obligation to notify a 
certain transaction and the standstill obligation. It follows that the use of 
the concept of “gun jumping” may well lead to confusion insofar as it refers 
to different infringements. This is due to the fact that, as seen before, most 
jurisdictions that adopt mandatory notification also impose a standstill 
obligation or waiting period on the merging parties. 
This ambiguous linguistic scenario is further complicated by the fact that 
some sources44 distinguish “substantive” gun jumping from “procedural” 
gun jumping. From this perspective, procedural gun jumping occurs in 
cases of implementation of a transaction without prior notification where 
notification is mandatory45 as well as in cases of pre-closing conducts in 
44 Dionnet and Giroux, Gun Jumping and OECD, Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications and 
Gun Jumping.
45 For some of the most recent cases, see Decision of the Spanish Comisiòn Nacional de los 
Mercados y la Competencia, 31 July 2014, Essilor, Case SNC/DC/0035/14, in which although the 
notification was made seven months after the execution of the merger, the Spanish competition 
authority accepted the argument brought by the parties pursuant to which the failure to notify had 
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violation of the relevant standstill obligations by partly or fully putting a 
merger into effect before the end of the standstill period;46 finally, substan-
tive gun jumping occurs in case of violations of prohibitions of horizontal 
anti-competitive agreements. 
As already seen with regard to the possible meeting of merger notifica-
tion thresholds, uncertainty may also arise with regard to what amounts 
to gun jumping. This may produce negative effects on transactions, since it 
may cause delays in the implementation of mostly pro-competitive trans-
actions, raise transaction costs and create incentives for businesses to test 
the limits of gun jumping prohibitions and circumvent standstill rules. 
These costs need to be balanced against the benefits of ex ante merger 
control and of delaying merger implementation for the duration of the 
standstill obligation. This also forces competition authorities to dedicate 
resources to the monitoring and prosecution of procedural matters.47
As far as the enforcement at the EU level of such obligations is 
concerned,48 at present the Commission has only rarely imposed fines 
been caused by a wrong calculation of their market share (as Spanish merger control thresholds 
partially involve market share calculations).
46 As far as procedural gun jumping is concerned, the failure to notify a transaction is surely the 
most straightforward gun jumping offense. This may happen because a mandatory notification is 
simply overlooked or forgotten, or for failure to identify a duty to notify or as an international lack 
of notification in order to speed up the merger process or avoid competition scrutiny. This will 
usually only occur when it is expected that a competition agency will never find out and bother to 
impose sanctions, or when the merger control agency is seen as lacking effective enforcement pow-
ers. In addition, many agencies may decide to give lenient treatment to first-time offenders and to 
abstain from prosecuting in a number of cases.
47 OECD, Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications and Gun Jumping, 10.
It is noteworthy that some cases of failure to notify actually raised competition concerns. This 
was the case inter alia in Germany ZA Raiffeisen/Wurth, decision of the Bundeskartellamt 
Tatigkeitsbericht 2009/10, 68 and Germany Marienhaus/Barmherzige Bruder Trier, 
Bundeskartellamt Fallbeicht B3-32/11 and B3-49/12 of 16 April 2013.
48 Of course the Commission is not the only competition authority which has shown interest in 
this kind of cases. For example, the French competition authority addressed the matter in Decision 
of 8 November 2016, n.16-D-24 relative à la situation du groupe Altice au regard du II de l’article 
L.430-8 du code du commerce and the same did the Bundeskartellamt, decision of 31 March 2015, 
B2-96/14. 
For other examples, see OECD, Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications and Gun Jumping, 20.
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for cases of “procedural gun jumping”. This was the case in 2009, 2014 
and 2018, when the Commission respectively fined Electrabel,49 Marine 
Harvest50 and Altice.51
49 See Judgment of 12 December 2012, Electrabel v. European Commission, T-332/09, EU:T:2012:672, 
and Judgment of 3 July 2014, Electrabel v. European Commission, C-84/13, EU:C:2014:2040. For 
the purposes of the present contribution, suffice it to say that in 2009 the Commission fined the 
Belgian electricity producer for failing to notify the acquisition of a minority stake in Compagnie 
Nationale du Rhone. More specifically, between June and December 2003 Electrabel increased its 
share in the target undertaking from approximately 17% to 49.95% and 47.92% of voting rights. In 
2007, Electrabel sought the Commission’s view on whether this shareholding could be considered 
to confer de facto sole control over the target undertaking. After prolonged discussions with the 
Commission, Electrabel finally notified the transaction in March 2008. After an ad-hoc investiga-
tion, in 2009 the Commission concluded that Electrabel had acquired control in 2003, thus trig-
gering the EUMR filing requirement. In establishing whether control had been acquired or not, 
the Commission took into account a number of factors including Electrabel’s shareholding in the 
target undertaking, the dispersed nature of the shareholders, many of whom did not attend general 
meetings, and the fact that Electrabel had a majority on the target’s board and a preferential right 
for further shares. The General Court upheld the decision rejecting Electrabel’s argument that its 
conduct merely amounted to a procedural violation and found that the failure to file a reportable 
transaction was a serious violation of EU competition law. In 2014, Electrabel’s appeal to the ECJ 
was rejected in its entirety, largely on procedural grounds.
50 See Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. European Commission, T-704/14, 
EU:T:2017:753. An appeal is currently before the General Court in T-704/14. Marine Harvest was 
fined for failure to notify the acquisition of sole control over Morpol ASA by means of an acquisi-
tion of a 48.5% shareholding. More specifically, Marine Harvest acquired 48% of the target under-
taking in 2012 and subsequently launched a public offer and acquired 87.1% of Morpol’s shares in 
2013. The merger was (conditionally) cleared, but then the Commission fined Marine Harvest on 
the grounds that it had already acquired de facto control over Morpol as a result of the 2012 trans-
action, thus breaching the standstill obligation. 
Indeed, the Commission held that the two transactions could not be considered as one single uni-
tary transaction, and that the acquisition of the 48.5% shareholding enabled Marine Harvest to 
enjoy a stable majority at the shareholders’ meetings as a consequence of the wide dispersion of the 
remaining shares (and previous attendance rates at these shareholders’ meetings), and therefore 
gave Marine Harvest de facto control over Morpol.
51 In July 2017, the Commission fined Altice for implementing the acquisition of sole control over 
PT Portugal before notification or approval by the Commission. More specifically, according to 
the Commission certain provisions of the purchase agreement entered into by the parties brought 
Altice to acquire the “legal right to exercise decisive influence over PT Portugal, for example by 
granting Altice veto rights over decisions concerning PT Portugal’s ordinary business”. This deci-
sive influence was indeed exercised in the context of strategic decisions of the target like marketing 
campaigns. In this context, the Commission emphasised that a breach of the standstill obligation 
may result from obtaining the ability to exercise a decisive influence or the actual exercise of deci-
sive influence. As noted in the OECD report, an interesting aspect of the case is the close analy-
sis of the purchase agreement and the conclusions of what constitutes veto rights concerning PT 
Portugal’s ordinary business, constituting the ability to exercise control. While the Commission 
fully acknowledges that “clauses determining the conduct of a target between signing a transaction 
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3. The ruling of the Court
In light of the clarifications just provided with regard to the legal back-
ground of the case, it is possible to better deal with the findings of the 
Court. Indeed, the ECJ replies to the preliminary questions by means of a 
systematic interpretation of article 7 EUMR.
Generally speaking, the Court held that KPMG DK Companies did not 
violate the standstill obligation.
More specifically, the Court acknowledges that article 7 of the EUMR 
does not give any indications as to the circumstances under which a con-
centration is deemed to be implemented and therefore this provision does 
not in itself clarify the scope of the prohibition it lays down.52 This is why 
giving an answer to the preliminary questions submitted by the Referring 
Court requires a systematic interpretation of article 7 EUMR based on its 
purpose and general scheme rather than on its literal meaning.
That said, the ECJ recalls that, as specified under recital 34 of the EUMR, 
the standstill obligation laid down under article 7 of the EUMR and the ex 
ante merger notification system adopted in the EU are aimed at ensuring 
an effective merger control.53 For these purposes, article 7 of the EUMR 
limits the standstill obligation only to concentrations as defined under 
article 3 of the EUMR; it follows that all those transactions which do not 
contribute to the implementation of a concentration do not fall into the 
scope of application of article 7 EUMR.54
The Court then emphasises that a concentration is deemed to arise 
where there is “a change of control on a lasting basis” (see paragraph 3.1): 
this implies that “a concentration within the meaning of article 7 arises as 
soon as the merging parties implement operations contributing to a lasting 
change in the control of the target undertaking”.55
agreement and closing the transaction in order to preserve its value are both common and appro-
priate in commercial transactions”, in the present case it concluded that the rights obtained 
extended beyond what is necessary for value preservation.
52 See Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, 
paragraph 38.
53 See Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, 
paragraph 42.
54 See Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, 
paragraph 49.
55 See Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, 
paragraph 46.
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Otherwise, the effet utile of article 7 EUMR would be reduced if the merg-
ing parties were prohibited from implementing a concentration by means 
of a single transaction, but could circumvent the prohibition through suc-
cessive partial operations. This would also hamper the functioning of the 
prior notification system designed by the EUMR.
The ECJ also makes reference to recital 20 of the EUMR,56 according to 
which it is appropriate to treat as a single concentration transactions that 
are closely connected in that they are linked by condition or take the form 
of a series of transactions in securities taking place within a reasonably 
short period of time. Indeed, where such transactions, despite having been 
carried out in the context of a concentration, are not necessary to achieve 
a change of control of an undertaking concerned by that concentration, 
they do not fall within the scope of article 7 EUMR. Such transactions, 
although they may be ancillary or preparatory to the concentration, do 
not present a direct functional link with its implementation, so that their 
implementation is not, in principle, likely to undermine the efficiency of 
the control of concentrations.
This is maybe one of the most important statements of the Decision, 
also in light of the applicative problems described under paragraph 3.2: as 
noted,57 the ECJ emphasises that a broader interpretation of article 7 EUMR 
would be incompatible with the merger control system, i.e. “extending the 
scope of article 7(1) to the actions that do not meet the ‘contributing to the 
change in control’ test would breach article 1 of the EUMR that sets the 
ambit of the Commission regulatory jurisdiction on mergers”. Indeed, “an 
extensive interpretation of article 7(1) would also correspondingly reduce 
the reach of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 and of article 101 TFEU”.
The fact that such transactions may produce effects on the market is not 
in itself sufficient to justify a different interpretation of article 7 EUMR. 
Indeed, first of all the assessment of a transaction’s effects on the market 
falls within the substantive examination of a concentration and does not 
impinge on the notion of concentration. The standstill obligation laid down 
by article 7 EUMR applies irrespectively of whether or not the merger is 
compatible with the common market. Second, it cannot be ruled out that 
a transaction having no effect might nevertheless contribute to the change 
56 See Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Kokurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:371, 
paragraph 48.
57 Giannino, “Is it too early wrong? The Court of Justice of the EU clarifies the concept of gun-
jumping”, 10.
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in control of the target undertaking and that therefore, at least partially, it 
implements the concentration.
It follows that, according to the Court, article 7 EUMR must be inter-
preted as prohibiting the implementation by the parties to the concentra-
tion of any transaction which contributes to lasting change of control over 
one of the undertakings concerned by the transaction.
The ECJ ends up pointing out that such an interpretation is fully coher-
ent with the general scheme of the EUMR. Indeed, such Regulation forms 
part of a legislative whole intended to complement articles 101 and 102 
TFEU and to establish a system aimed at ensuring that competition is not 
distorted in the internal market. Therefore, extending the scope of arti-
cle 7 EUMR to transactions not contributing to the implementation of a 
concentration would amount to extending the scope of the regulation in 
breach of article 1 thereof, but also to correspondingly reducing the scope 
of Regulation 1/2003, which would then no longer be applicable to such 
operations, even if they may give rise to coordination between undertak-
ings for the purposes of article 101 TFEU.
In light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that article 7 EUMR must 
be interpreted as meaning that a concentration is implemented only by a 
transaction which, in whole or in part, in fact or in law, contributes to the 
change in control of the target undertaking.
As for the case at stake, this means that the EY companies have not 
acquired the possibility of exercising any influence over the KPMG DK 
Companies by that termination, as is apparent from the fact that the lat-
ter companies were, in the context of competition law, independent both 
before and after that termination. This was the case despite the fact that 
the merger agreement expressly provided for the KPMG DK Companies’ 
withdrawal from the cooperation agreement. Thus, even though, absent 
the concentration, the KPMG DK Companies would likely not have ter-
minated the agreement, the termination itself did not confer to the KPMG 
DK Companies’ counterpart any possibility to exercise influence over the 
KPMG DK Companies.
4. Conclusive remarks
As anticipated, the Decision was long awaited by scholars, professionals 
and market players. Indeed, scholars were ready to welcome the first case 
ever in which the ECJ was called to give a systematic answer to one of the 
most controversial and less studied topics of EU merger control. On the 
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other hand, professionals and market players were eager to receive clarifi-
cations on a costly and time consuming issue, with relevant impact on the 
management of complex transactions.
From a certain point of view, no one should be disappointed by the out-
come of the Decision.
From an academic point of view, also thanks to the contribution of the 
AG, the Court has given a clear and precious overview of the EU merger 
control system as a whole and has managed to reconcile several differ-
ent notions like the ones of concentration, control and standstill, bring-
ing them to unity in a magisterial way. At a closer look, this was the only 
possible outcome given the grounds on which both the AG and Court 
based their work: a positive definition of what amounts to procedural gun 
jumping (meaning an analytical and exhaustive list of acts) would not be 
efficient and therefore one should make use of a negative definition. A 
negative definition may work only if it is conceptually well-tailored and 
coherent with the EU merger control system and that is unequivocally true 
in the Decision, which appears to be well argued and justified.
Another interesting aspect from an academic perspective is the fact that 
the ECJ points out that applying the merger control provisions to actions 
that do not contribute to a change of control but are nevertheless capable 
of leading to co-ordination could fall under the scope of the antitrust rules 
when they do not fall within the scope of merger control rules. This is rel-
evant insofar as it helps strengthening the idea that EU competition law is 
a coherent and unitary system.
From a practical point of view, the Court has surely confirmed that pre-
merger assessment will have to be carefully carried out by companies will-
ing to enter into notifiable transactions. Moreover, the ECJ has surely given 
some kind of clarifications regarding the way in which pre-merger analysis 
will have to be carried out. On the other hand, as noted,58 the Decision 
indicates that the perimeter of gun-jumping prohibition is not infinitely 
elastic, as its scope is functionally connected to the concept of concentra-
tion, to the effect that the reach of the standstill obligation could not go 
beyond the purview of the Commission’s jurisdiction on mergers as deter-
mined by article 1 of the EUMR. This also represents a useful contribution 
58 Giannino, “Is it too early wrong? The Court of Justice of the EU clarifies the concept of gun-
jumping”, 10.
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to the solution of the “minority shareholding acquisition” issue described 
under paragraph 3.2, as some authors envisaged back in 2010.59 
Nevertheless, the test provided in the Decision still appears to be quite 
vague, so that further clarification would be appreciated. In this respect, to 
a closer look it seems that problem lays in the fact that the ECJ linked the 
notion of standstill pursuant to article 7 EUMR to the one of concentra-
tion, which is linked to the notion of control. As seen (see paragraph 3.1), 
the notion of control is quite broad as it includes de facto control. Put dif-
ferently, it seems that the Decision may risk to shift the problem from the 
concept of standstill to the one of de facto control, which is in itself quite 
broad and vague. 
But again, at a closer look this was the only possible outcome given that 
both the AG and the Court refused the possibility to make reference to a 
“positive” definition of gun jumping acts.
Finally, one should not underestimate the implications of the statement 
under which articles 101 and 102 TFEU shall be applied to actions that do 
not contribute to a change of control but are nevertheless capable of lead-
ing to co-ordination. Indeed, this may help in giving an answer to another 
very controversial issue in EU merger control, which is the potential inves-
tigation of consummated and non-notifiable mergers, since they fall below 
the notification thresholds of any merger control system, or since there 
was no obligation to report the transaction (e.g. because the notification 
system has exceptions or is voluntary). Although a careful examination of 
this topic would exceed the limits of the present contribution, suffice it to 
say that if by their very nature articles 101 and 102 TFEU shall be applied 
to actions that do not contribute to a change of control, it may be possible 
to argue that a competition authority may in any case resort to general 
antitrust provisions on horizontal agreements and unilateral conduct or 
abuse of dominance also in case of non-notified mergers.
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